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The political economy of India’s economic growth is an issue of abiding interest. Higher and 
sustained economic growth has, all over the world, been the surest and most time tested 
means of raising living standards and reducing poverty. Further, given that it is a functioning 
democracy, economic policy in India can often be dictated by political expediency as political 
parties indulge in competitive populism in the face of improvements in social indicators such 
as literacy, infant mortality and the like lagging behind rises in the rate of economic growth. 
Thus the political economy of policy formulation is an important area of concern. Finally, an 
analysis of what policies can be undertaken given these constraints is an important indicator 
of potential welfare implications of policies for such a large section of humanity.  
Several recent reviews of India’s recent growth experience exist (Rodrik and Subrahmanian, 
2004, Kelkar, 2004, and Thirlwell, 2004 are three examples).  The value added of the present 
paper is to place India’s growth experience within a broader political economy perspective. It 
documents the broad contours of economic growth in India; it then analyzes some emerging 
obstacles to higher economic growth  and finally the prospects for accelerating the economic 
reforms program to place India on a sustained higher economic growth path.   
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I. Introduction  
 
The political economy of India’s economic growth is an issue of abiding interest. Higher and 
sustained economic growth has, all over the world, been the surest and most time tested 
means of raising living standards and reducing poverty. Further, given that it is a functioning 
democracy, economic policy in India can often be dictated by political expediency as political 
parties indulge in competitive populism in the face of improvements in social indicators such 
as literacy, infant mortality and the like lagging behind rises in the rate of economic growth. 
Thus the political economy of policy formulation is an important area of concern. Finally, an 
analysis of what policies can be undertaken given these constraints is an important indicator 
of potential welfare implications of policies for such a large section of humanity.  
Several recent reviews of India’s recent growth experience exist (Rodrik and Subrahmanian, 
2004, Kelkar, 2004, and Thirlwell, 2004 are three examples).  The value added of the present 
paper is to place India’s growth experience within a broader political economy perspective. It 
documents the broad contours of economic growth in India (section II); then analyzes the 
emerging obstacles to higher economic growth (section III) and finally the prospects for 
accelerating the economic reforms program to place India on a sustained higher economic 
growth path (section IV). Section V concludes.  
II. The Record of Economic Growth in India 
The record of economic growth (annual rate of growth of real GNP) in independent India has 
been uneven. Until about 1980 growth rates were low and subject to considerable volatility. 
This record has improved since then. In Table 1 we depict salient characteristics of aggregate 
economic growth in India.  
Table 1: Some Basic Characteristics of Growth of Real GNP in India 
 
Period Mean Annual Growth Rate 
(percentages) 
Standard Deviation of Year to Year Growth Rate 
(percentages) 
1951-52 to 1959-60 3.58 2.62 
1960-61 to 1969-70 3.91 3.64 
1970-71 to 1979-80 3.05 4.16 
1980-81 to 1989-90 5.65 2.27 
1990-91 to 1999-00 5.83 1.97 
1992-93 to 1999-00 6.46 1.16 
Source:  Author’s calculation based on data from Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 
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In aggregate terms growth appears to have picked up significantly since the 1980s.  Further, 
the variability of this growth (as measured by the standard deviation) has come down 
significantly. Per capita GDP growth which was 1.2 percent per annum during 1972-82, 
accelerated to 3.0 percent during 1982-92 and further to 3.9 percent during 1992-2002. So the 
Indian economy has been enjoying high and relatively stable rates of growth for almost a 
quarter century now.1  
However, although India’s economic growth record has been truly impressive the country 
does not perform as well on a broader set of human development indicators. India’s Human 
Development Indicator (HDI) score, for example, improved only marginally from 0.302 in 
1981 to 0.381 in 1991 and 0.472 in 2001. India’s HDI rank in 2002 was 124th – which was a 
deterioration on the rank (of 115th) attained in the previous year.  In 2003 there was further 
slippage and India was 127th in the global ranking.  
Assessment of performance according to a broader criteria such as human development 
indicators is important for at least two reasons – first, these figures indicate whether 
economic growth, as such, has been impacting upon the poor. Second, the poor progress in 
areas other than GDP (but which are of considerable significance to the population at large) 
might risk loss of popular support for the policies that made high GDP growth possible in the 
first place. This, as argued later in the chapter, might then appear as a constraint on attaining 
high growth rates.  
What is the sectoral distribution of India’s economic growth? Table 2 displays broad 
averages of sectoral growth rates as well as the significance of these sectors measured by 
their shares in GDP.  Agricultural growth has continued to fluctuate considerably even as the 
share of agriculture in GDP has come down sharply.2  Manufacturing sector growth rates 
have not been particularly high and the share of industry in GDP has been stagnant at about 
22 per cent. Manufacturing growth was high in the initial years of the post reforms period but 
fell sharply in 2001-02. The subsequent pick-up in 2002-03 was probably because of the 
                                                 
1 Latest available data (RBI 2004) indicates that there has been a further sharp acceleration in the 
growth rate of real GDP in the second quarter of 2003-04. In the third quarter this reached double-
digit levels.  All sectors grew sharply.  Agriculture recovered smartly from a downturn in 2002-03 on 
the back of two successive good harvests. The manufacturing and services sector continued their rapid 
growth.  It remains to be season whether this sharp rise is a temporary blip in the growth trend.  
 
2 The share of agriculture in employment is, however, much higher. One of the current important 
anomalies in the Indian economy is that a sector that produces 25 percent of GDP employs 65 precent 
of the labour force.  
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lower base in 2001-02. Similar comments hold for mining. Growth in electricity production 
has been slow – perhaps reflecting the poor state of electricity generation and, particularly, 
transmission and distribution in India.  The highest growth sector has been services.  Growth 
in this sector has occurred across a broad range and has been the most stable of all sectoral 
growth rates. As a consequence, the share of services in GDP has gone up substantially.  
 
Table 2: Growth Rates of Real GDP (Per cent) 
 
Sector 2002-03 2001-02 
1992-93  
to 2001 average 
Agriculture and Allied Activities  -3.2 
(22.1) 
5.7 
(23.9)  
3.0 
(27.9)  
Industry, of which 5.7 
(21.8) 
3.2 
(21.5) 
6.6 
(22.0) 
(i) manufacturing  6.1 3.4 7.2 
(ii) mining and quarrying  5.0 1.0 4.1 
(iii) Electricity, gas and water supply  3.9 4.3 5.9 
Services, of which  7.1 
(56.1) 
6.5 
(54.6) 
7.7 
(50.1) 
(i) Trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and communication  7.8 8.7 8.3 
(ii) Financing, insurance, real estate and business services 6.1 4.5 8.1 
(iii) Community, social and personal services  6.8 5.6 7.3 
(iv) Construction  7.2 3.7 5.5 
GDP at factor cost  4.3 5.6 6.1 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate share in GDP. 
Source: Central Statistical Organization.  
 
 
The evolution over time of the sectoral composition of Indian GDP is portrayed in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Sectoral Composition of India's GDP
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Source: Based on data from Handbook of Indian Statistics (2001), Reserve Bank of India. 
The higher GDP growth rate beginning in the 1980s has been accompanied by an even 
sharper acceleration in total factor productivity growth. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) 
examine a number of possible explanations for this rise in productivity/growth. Such 
explanations include Keynesian type demand-led expansion in the 1980s, the advent of the 
Green Revolution, and possible external and internal liberalization.  However, they find 
empirical support for attitudinal changes in the governments of Indira and later, Rajiv 
Gandhi.  These administrations, it is argued, began viewing private investment and enterprise 
more favorably. This had salutary effects on manufacturing sector productivity and later had 
substantial spillover effects. Such beneficial synergies were helped by the climate of 
deregulation and delicensing started in the early 1990s.  Other authors have placed a much 
stronger emphasis on the role of the post 1991 reforms and downplayed the role of policy 
initiatives of the 1980s. 3  To be sure, financial sector reforms began only in 1993 and are yet 
to be completed.4 
 
                                                 
3 There has been a debate of sorts about whether attitudinal changes in the government bureaucracy or 
actual policy changes are better explanations for the acceleration in economic growth in India.  In a 
country with an autarkic trade regime and a highly centralized administrative structure, attitudinal 
changes may well be the hardest to make. Hence, both policy measures as well as attitudinal changes 
should be regarded as essential as well as complementary explanations for this surge in the rate of 
growth.  
4 For a review of financial sector reforms in India see Sharma (2004).  
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The current high rate of economic growth could well accelerate further as Kelkar (2004) has 
opined. Contributing to this acceleration is a broad series of reforms including financial 
sector reforms, increased globalization and widening and deepening of product and financial 
markets. The impact of such reforms gets reflected in key indicators such as market 
capitalization of the stock market, the technology and transparency of transactions, the sets of 
instruments traded, balance sheets of financial institutions and the degree of openness of the 
economy.  At the same time a benign FDI policy framework has permitted greater tie-ups in 
high technology areas for production for domestic as well as external markets.  
Adding to the impetus for higher economic growth are certain structural changes occurring in 
the Indian economy – particularly on the supply side. In 2000 the proportion of the Indian 
population in the working age group (15-64 age bracket) was 60.9%.   The UN’s Population 
Division has projected that this ratio will surpass the proportion of Japanese in this age group 
by 2012 and climb to over 66% in 30 years. At that point in time it is poised to overtake 
China’s population in the same age group.  This is a very significant projection.  
At the same time a quiet revolution is taking place in nutritional status in India. Table 3 
(based on the author’s computations) reports on the proportion of the rural population in India 
that is nutritionally deprived. This assessment is based on the assumption that all persons are 
working (alternately) according to three work norms – sedentary, moderate and heavy.  These 
three norms imply different minimum calorific requirements with the “sedentary” norm being 
the lowest and the “heavy” norm being the highest.   Results are reported for three time 
periods – 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 for the rural sector where almost 70 % of India’s 
population (of 1,027,015,247 according to the 2001 census) resides. This table indicates the 
sharp decline in nutritional deprivation that has occurred in India.  An even shaper decline 
has occurred in the severity of protein undernutrition in rural India.5  By all accounts, an at 
least comparable decline has occurred in the incidence of undernutrition and its severity in 
India’s urban sector.  Further, during the period 1991 to 2001 the literacy rate climbed from 
51.54 % to 65.38 % in the aggregate, from 63.3 % to 75.85 % for males and from 38.79 to 
54.16 % for females, according to the figures of the 2001 Census of India.  
 
 
                                                 
5 As explained in Jha (2001) the 1999-00 figures are not strictly comparable with those for earlier 
years. This was because of important sampling and other methodological changes in the 55th Round of 
the National Sample Survey on which these results are based.  
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Table 3 Calorie Deficiency in Rural India  
Sedentary Work Norm 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 
Proportion of rural population 
below minimum norm  
0.55 0.28 0.11 
Moderate Work Norm 
Proportion of rural population 
below minimum norm 
0.69 0.38 0.188 
Heavy Work Norm 
Proportion of rural population 
below minimum norm 
0.87 0.59 0.441 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Sample Survey Results for the 43rd Round (1987-88), 50th Round (1993-94) 
and 55th Round (1999-00).  “Sedentary” norm is defined as 2400 calories per day per adult male, 1900 per adult female and 
1300 per child. “Moderate” norm is defined as 2800 calories per adult male, 2200 per adult female and 1300 per child. “Heavy” 
work norm is defined as 3900 per adult male, 3000 per adult female and 1300 per child.  
 
Clearly India’s labour force is undergoing rapid structural transformation: the proportion of 
the working population is rising; the labour force is less nutritionally deprived and 
increasingly literate. These changes imply substantial quality improvements in the Indian 
labour force.  Economic theory and international experience leads us to believe that this will 
lead to sharp rises in labour productivity and an upward shift in the trend long run rate of 
growth of the Indian economy.  
 
III. Emerging Constraints on Rapid Economic Growth in India  
 
Having analyzed the prospects for rapid economic growth in India it behooves us to examine 
some emerging constraints. Evolution of the Indian economy according to the sanguine 
aggregate picture sketched above is subject to how these constraints to rapid economic 
growth in India work themselves out. We classify these constraints in four categories: (i) 
increasing spatial inequality; (ii) stagnating employment; (iii) high fiscal deficit; and (iv) 
inadequate growth of infrastructure.  These constraints often reinforce each other – 
particularly through the democratic political process. I now discuss these in turn.  
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i) Increasing regional inequality 
The aggregate economic growth narrative presented above masks substantial spatial 
variations. The regional variation in economic growth in India has remained stubbornly high 
despite the reforms. Table 4 presents mean growth rates and standard deviation for fifteen 
major states of India.  In almost every year the mean growth rate has been lower than the 
(spatial) standard deviation of these growth rates, indicating persistently high spatial 
variability. As a consequence per capita incomes show a tendency to diverge across Indian 
states.  Figure 2 plots the intertemporal behaviour of the coefficient of variation of per capita 
incomes across fifteen major Indian states. This shows an upward trend, further underscoring 
the divergence of incomes across space.  
   
Table 4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Growth Rates of fifteen major Indian states 
 S.D.of growth of real SDP Mean growth of real SDP 
1981-82 6.57 6.18 
1982-83 5.12 3.17 
1983-84 5.95 5.93 
1984-85 4.85 2.74 
1985-86 6.03 5.62 
1986-87 4.52 2.94 
1987-88 7.68 3.83 
1988-89 9.56 12.62 
1989-90 5.07 5.56 
1990-91 7.58 6.11 
1991-92 6.41 3.16 
1992-93  9.15 5.48 
1993-94 4.30 5.98 
1994-95 5.03 5.70 
1995-96 4.41 5.27 
1996-97 5.87 6.37 
1997-98 4.15 4.38 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 2001, Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
This increasing divergence across the states gets reflected in other critical areas as well, e.g. 
the regional incidence of poverty, particularly rural poverty.  Figure 3 shows that economic 
reforms have been accompanied by a rising coefficient of variation (across fifteen major 
Indian states) of the head count ratio of poverty.  This coefficient of variation has had a 
distinct upward trend – particularly in the 1990s.  
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Figure 2: CV of Real Per Capita Incomes in Fifteen Major Indian States 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 2001, Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Coefficients of Variation of Head Count Ratios in the Rural, Urban and Aggregte 
Sectors
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Note:  cvr= coefficient of variation of rural Head Count ratio,  
cvu= coefficient of variation of urban Head Count ratio;  
cva= coefficient of variation of aggregate Head Count ratio.  
Source:  Jha (2001) 
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Jha (2001) shows that there is lack of convergence (in a formal statistical sense) in the 
incidence of rural poverty across Indian states both in terms of their ranks with respect to 
poverty as well as in terms of their levels of poverty.  In fact in respect of the critical 
magnitudes of poverty, mean consumption and inequality of consumption, economic reforms 
do not seem to have made much difference to the inequality across Indian states for any 
category except urban mean consumption. This lack of convergence extends itself to the level 
of NSS agro-climatic zones (NSS regions)6 as Jha and Sharma (2003) point out.  
 
This rising regional inequality is now a matter of concern. Reducing interstate disparities has 
been an important objective of government policy. The five-year plans of the Government of 
India have used public investment and industrial licensing to promote balanced regional 
development. Transfers from the central government to state governments under both the 
capital and the current categories through the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission are overwhelmingly equalizing in nature. Thus, the 10th Finance Commission 
(Government of India, 1994), the recommendations of which guided federal transfers 
between 1995-2000, advocated the following weight structure for the devolution formula: 20 
percent on the basis of the population of 1971 and 60 percent on the basis of the inverse of 
the distance between the per capita income of the state in question from the mean per capita 
income. With the onset of market-oriented economic reforms, government transfers and 
investments began to play a diminished role7 in the economic activity of states, so that 
regional disparities, which exist because of divergent economic conditions among the various 
states of India, get aggravated. Further, as Jha (2004) has shown, there has been some 
increase of personal inequality in India as a consequence of the economic reforms program.  
 
To further investigate the increasing concentration of the poor in India I identify five states 
with the highest number of calorie-deprived and those with the highest number of 
expenditure poor in 1987-88 and follow the progress of these states over time. Data 
                                                 
6 A National Sample Survey (NSS) region has a certain agro-climatic homogeneity within it. Small 
states such as Tripura constitute one region whereas larger states such as Uttar Pradesh are made up of 
more than one such region. States may not be a good unit of analysis in a regionally diversified 
country such as India. Even within the states there is considerable heterogeneity – coastal Maharashtra 
versus interior Maharashtra, Eastern vs. Western Madhya Pradesh etc. In the area of poverty 
incidence, for example, only Orissa and a few other states are such that there is a clear-cut congruence 
between high incidence of poverty and state geographical boundaries.  
7 It does not help that some of these poorest states have weak governance structures.  In some cases 
funds are unspent because of inefficient administration, in other cases development funds are often 
diverted by cash-starved states to pay current administration salaries.  
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pertaining to the rural sector from the last three quinquennial rounds of 1987-88 (43rd round), 
1993-94 (50th round) and 1999-2000 (55th round) are used. All results refer to the rural 
sectors of these states and the national economy.  Using norms developed by the Nutrition 
Expert Group of the National Institute of Nutrition for moderate work, the five states with 
largest number of people with nutritional intake below the recommended minimum in 1987-
88 were UP (with 12.7 per cent of the calorie deprived in rural India), Bihar (with 9.7 per 
cent), MP (with 7.83 per cent), Maharashtra (with 7.03 per cent), and Tamilnadu (with 5.67 
per cent). The performance of these five states over the three NSS rounds in respect of calorie 
deprivation is traced in the upper panel of Table 5.   Also noted (within parentheses) are the 
shares of the rural sectors of these states in national rural population, reckoned according to 
the sizes of the NSS sample originating from these states: in 1987-88 UP had 12.81per cent 
of the national rural population.   
 
Table 5 
State  43rd round (1987-88) 50th round (1993-94) 55th round (1999-2000)  
 Per cent of  
national total of 
deprived  
(Per cent of 
national 
population)  
Rank in terms of 
number deprived 
1987-88 
Per cent of  
national total of 
deprived  
(Per cent of 
national 
population) 
Rank in terms of 
number deprived 
1993-94 
Per cent of 
national total of 
deprived  
(Per cent of 
national 
population) 
Rank in terms of 
number deprived 
1999-2000 
Calories  
UP 12.7 (12.81) 1 10.6  (13.1) 2 11.2  (13.4) 2 
Bihar 9.7   (9.63) 2 9.04   (10.1) 3 20.62 (10.5) 1 
MP 7.6   (7.83) 3 8.67   (7.83)  4 8.29    (7.4) 6 
Maharashtra 7.4   (7.03) 4 11       (6.5) 1 5.53    (5.9) 7 
Tamilnadu 6.1    (5.67)   5 5.61     (5.5)  8 9.71    (5.9) 4 
Total of the five 
states 43.5   (42.9)  44.9   (43.1)  55.3  (43.1)  
Expenditure  
State  43rd round (1987-88) 50th round (1993-94) 55th round (1999-2000)  
 Per cent of 
national total of 
expenditure-poor  
(Per cent of 
national 
population)  
Rank in terms of 
number   deprived 
1987-88 
Per cent of 
national total of 
expenditure-poor 
(Per cent of 
national 
population) 
Rank in terms of 
number deprived 
1993-94 
Per cent of 
national total of 
expenditure-poor 
(Per cent of 
national 
population) 
Rank in terms of 
number deprived 
1999-2000 
UP 14.99 (12.81) 1 15.28 (13.1) 2 15.2 (13.4) 2 
Bihar 13.25 (9.63) 2 17.35 (10.1) 1 18.51 (10.5) 1 
MP 11.23 (7.83) 3 11.36 (7.83) 3 13.46 (7.4) 3 
Andhra Pradesh 8.14 (7.43) 4 7.08 (7.11) 6 8.14 (7.47) 5 
Maharashtra 7.86 (7.03) 5 8.16 (6.5) 5 6.02 (5.91) 7 
Total of the five 
states  55.47 (44.73)  59.23 (44.64)  61.35 (44.66)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on National Sample Survey Data.  
 
 
The lower panel of Table 5 reports results from an analogous analysis in terms of the number 
of people falling below the expenditure poverty line. Thus in 1987-1988 UP had the largest 
number of expenditure poor in the Indian rural sector - with 14.99 per cent of the national 
number.   
ASARC Working Paper 2004/12  10 
The Political Economy of Recent Economic Growth in India Raghbendra Jha 
The single most important conclusions to be drawn from this table is that the shares of the 
chosen five states (in each case) in the number of deprived increased steadily over time even 
though their share of national rural population remained almost constant. In 1987-88 UP, 
Bihar, MP, Maharashtra and Tamilnadu together had 43.5 per cent of the total nutritionally 
deprived in India’s rural sector. This increased to 44.9 per cent in 1993-94 and 55.3 per cent 
in 1999-2000.  The combined shares of these states in national rural population was, 
however, almost steady at 43 per cent over this period. 
 
The combined share of UP, Bihar, MP, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra in the national 
expenditure-poor figure was 55.47 per cent in 1987-88. This increased to 59.23 per cent in 
1993-94 and to 61.35 per cent in 1999-2000.   However, the combined share of these five 
states in national rural population was almost steady at slightly above 44.6 per cent.  
 
The increasing concentration of deprivation has created a situation in which the poor are ill 
placed to take advantage of new opportunities created by economic reforms just as they may 
suffer less from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were artificially protected prior to 
reforms.  Thus the poor do not have much stake in the success of the economic reforms 
program.  In a democratic country such as India, this means that political parties espousing 
pro-reform policies may not necessarily win elections.  This has emerged as a significant 
constraint on rapid economic growth in India.  
(ii) Rising Unemployment  
 
An additional emerging constraint on rapid economic growth in India is the inability – at least 
so far - of the reforms to generate a sufficient number of jobs.  India has long had problems 
with unemployment and underemployment.  However, economic growth in the pre-reform 
period did impact on unemployment by raising the demand for labour. The employment 
elasticity of output growth was high. But, one of the characteristics of post-reform economic 
growth in India has been the relatively sluggish growth of employment even in the face of 
buoyant output growth. 
 
Unemployment statistics in India have been classified into three separate categories: (i) usual 
status (us), (ii) current weekly status (cws) and (iii) current daily status (cds). ‘Usual’ status 
indicates the extent of unemployment 'for a relatively longer period during the reference 
period of 365 days' and indicates the magnitude of chronic unemployment. However, some of 
ASARC Working Paper 2004/12  11 
The Political Economy of Recent Economic Growth in India Raghbendra Jha 
those who are unemployed by this criterion might be working in a subsidiary capacity. When 
the unemployment rate excludes those employed in subsidiary capacity, the corresponding 
figures are reported in column 'us adjusted'. Weekly status indicates the number unemployed 
(per thousand) during the average week of the survey year. It includes those who are 
chronically unemployed as well as those who are intermittently unemployed among the 
usually employed category due to seasonal fluctuations in the labor market. Lastly, the daily 
status gives the same information for an average day during the survey year.  The S.P. Gupta 
committee has recommended the use of Current Daily Status (CDS) for measuring 
employment, as this measure of employment is net of the varying degrees of unemployment 
experienced by those who are otherwise classified as employed on usual status basis.  Hence 
we present results using this criterion in this chapter.  Table 6 provides details on 
employment and unemployment in India in recent times.  
 
 
Table 6: Employment and Unemployment on Current Daily Status (CDS) Basis 
 
 (Million) Growth per annum (%) 
 1983 1993-94 1999-00 1983 to 1993-94 1993-94 to  
1999-2000 
                                              All India 
Population  718.20 894.01 1003.97 2.0 1.95 
Labour Force  261.33 335.97 363.33 2.43 1.31 
Workforce  239.57 315.84 336.75 2.70 1.07 
Unemployment Rate (%)   8.30 5.99 7.32   
Number unemployed  21.76 20.13 26.58 -0.08 4.74 
                                               Rural  
Population  546.61 658.83 727.50 1.79 1.67 
Labour Force  204.18 255.38 270.39 2.15 0.96 
Workforce  187.92 241.04 250.89 2.40 0.67 
Unemployment Rate (%)   7.96 5.61 7.21   
Number unemployed  16.26 14.34 19.50 -1.19 5.26 
                                              Urban  
Population  171.59 234.98 276.47 3.04 2.74 
Labour Force  57.15 80.60 92.95 3.33 2.40 
Workforce  51.64 74.80 85.84 3.59 2.32 
Unemployment Rate (%)   9.64 7.19 7.65   
Number unemployed  5.51 5.80 7.11 0.49 3.45 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002-03 
 
 
The data in Table 6 originate from labour market studies of the National Sample Survey. 
There appears to have been a sharp decline in the rate of employment growth in the 1990s. 
This decline has been associated with a comparatively higher rate of growth of GDP, 
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indicating a decline in the labour intensity of production. Further, the data reveal that the 
decline in the rate of growth of employment was associated with a sharp decline in the rate of 
growth of the labour force.  Both the absolute number of unemployed as well as the incidence 
of unemployment (expressed in terms of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force) 
increased during this period.   
 
To discover the underpinnings of the drop in the growth of employment we examine the 
sectoral composition of employment growth.  This is reported in Table 7.  
 
 
Table 7: Sectoral Employment Growth (CDS Basis) 
 Employment (in million) Annual growth (per cent) 
Sector 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 1983 to 
1987-88 
1987-88 to 
1993-94 
1983-
1993-94 
1993-94 to 
1999-2000 
Agriculture  151.35 163.82 190.72 190.94 1.77 2.57 2.23 0.02 
Industry, of which   
Mining and quarrying  1.74 2.40 2.54 2.26 7.35 1.00 3.68 -1.91 
Manufacturing 27.69 32.53 35.00 40.79 3.64 1.23 2.26 2.58 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply  
0.83 0.94 1.43 1.15 2.87 7.19 5.31 -3.55 
Construction  7.17 11.98 11.02 14.95 12.08 -1.38 4.18 5.21 
Services, of which   
Trade, hotels and 
restaurants  
18.17 22.53 26.88 37.54 4.89 2.99 3.80 5.72 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
6.99 8.05 9.88 13.65 3.21 3.46 3.35 5.53 
Financial, insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 
2.10 2.59 3.37 4.62 4.72 4.50 4.60 5.40 
Community, social and 
personal services  
23.52 27.55 34.98 30.84 3.57 4.06 3.85 -2.08 
All sectors  239.57 272.39 315.84 336.75 2.89 2.50 2.67 1.07 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002-03 Based on NSS.  
 
 
 
The decline in the overall growth rate of employment in 1994-2000 was largely attributable 
to two factors: a near stagnation of employment in agriculture and a slowdown in public 
sector employment.  The share of agriculture in total employment dropped substantially from 
60 per cent in 1993-94 to 57 percent in 1999-2000. On the other hand, employment growth in 
all the sub-sectors within services (except community, social and personal services having 
negative growth rates) exceeded 5 per cent per annum. As has been the trend in the past, the 
share of casual labour in total employment has gone up.  
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Only a small percentage (8 to 9 percent) of the total workforce of the country is employed in 
the organized sector.  While employment growth in the private organized sector improved 
significantly in the 1990s, the growth in employment in the public sector was negligible. 
Since the public sector accounts for more than two thirds of the total organized sector 
employment, there was a substantial slow down of the overall growth in organized sector 
employment.   
The Ninth Five Year Plan of the Government of India projected a decline in the population 
growth rate to 1.59 per cent per annum by the end of the Ninth Plan, from over 2 per cent in 
the previous three decades. However, it expected the growth rate of the labour force to 
reach a peak level of 2.54 per cent per annum over this period; the highest it has ever been 
and is ever likely to attain. This is because of the change in age structure, with the highest 
growth occurring in the 15-19 years age group in the Ninth Plan period.  
The Ninth Plan expected an additional 53 millions to join the labour force on the "usual 
status" concept basis. It assumed a GDP growth rate of an average of 7 percent during the 
Plan period. This, together with greater emphasis on agriculture, was expected to help 
create 54 million work opportunities over the period. This would lead to a reduction in the 
open unemployment rate from 1.9 per cent in 1996-97 to 1.47 per cent in the Plan's terminal 
year, that is, by about a million persons - from 7.5 million to 6.63 million.  
Thus the Plan emphasized the view that a GDP growth rate of about 7 percent would be 
required to absorb the new additions to the labour force. If the economy could grow at 
around 8 per cent per annum during the Plan period, the incidence of open unemployment 
could be brought down by two million persons, thus attaining near full employment by the 
end of the Plan period, according to the Plan.  It is quite clear now that target of India's 
Ninth Five-Year Plan to create 54 million new jobs during the Plan period (1997-2002) has 
not been fulfilled.  The economy grew at a rate slower than 7 percent and agricultural 
investment was sluggish. In addition, there was at least one year of poor agricultural 
growth. These factors combined to ensure that employment did not grow as anticipated in 
the Ninth Plan.  
In addition to open unemployment there also exists India’s persistent problem of underem-
ployment. Underemployment in various segments of the labour force is quite high. The 
estimates of the 50th Round of the NSS indicate that although open unemployment was only 
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2 per cent in 1993-94 on US basis, the incidence of under-employment and unemployment 
taken together was as much as 10 per cent that year. This occurred despite the fact that the 
incidence of underemployment was reduced substantially in the decade ending 1993-94.  
The higher unemployment creates a political climate in which policy measures such as 
increased liberalization of international trade become increasingly difficult to take since 
such policies may be construed to involve short-term increases in unemployment or, at the 
least, increase the perceived uncertainty of tenure of employment. In fact since 
liberalization policies might entail greater vulnerability to external risk, there might well be 
pressures for governments to increase employment in the public sector (Rodrik, 1998). This 
might well bloat up the size of an inefficient public sector and reduce the effectiveness of 
any economic reforms program.  
(iii) High Fiscal Deficit  
India’s fiscal deficit woes have been well documented (see, for instance, Jha, Chand and 
Sharma (2003)).   The combined fiscal deficit of the central and state governments has been 
hovering near 10 percent of GDP for quite some time now.  Some details are provided in 
Table 8: 
Table 8: Combined Receipts and Disbursements of the Central and State Governments (percent of GDP)  
 1990-91 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 
(R.E). 
2002-03 
(B.E.) 
Total Receipts (A+B)  26.8 25.9 26.4 28.0 28.4 29.2 30.1 
A. Revenue Receipts (1+2)  18.6 17.8 16.5 17.7 18.0 18.5 20.0 
1. Tax Receipts  15.4 14.3 13.4 14.2 14.5 14.4 15.8 
2. Non-tax receipts, of which   3.2 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.5 4.1 4.2 
Interest receipts  4.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 
B. Capital Receipts, of which   8.2 8.1 9.9 10.3 10.4 10.7 10.0 
a) Disinvestment proceeds  0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 
b) Recovery of loans and 
advances  
0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 
Total disbursements (a+b+c)  28.8 25.8 26.6 28.2 28.3 29.5 30.3 
a) Revenue 22.8 21.9 22.9 24.0 24.6 25.2 25.9 
b)Capital  3.9 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.9 3.4 3.6 
c) Loans and advances  2.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 
Revenue deficit  4.2 4.1 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.6 5.9 
Gross fiscal deficit  9.4 7.3 9.0 9.5 9.5 10.0 9.3 
N.B. B.E. = budget estimate, R.E. = revised estimate 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002-03.  
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As a result the public debt of India has been climbing steadily and is currently reported at 
about 85 percent of GDP. There has been a change in the composition of this debt, however, 
with the share of external debt falling and that of internal debt rising.  
This persistently high fiscal deficit has had deleterious effects.  It has reduced the amount of 
resources available for investment by lowering public saving.  The saving rate in India at 23.1 
percent of GDP is lower than the levels needed to sustain growth rates of 8 percent and above 
for long.  In addition, public dissaving because of the high fiscal deficit is reducing the 
resources available for investment (Saggar, 2003).  Since 1998-99 the public sector has been 
dissaving continuously. Furthermore, some of the savings-investment gap spills over onto the 
external balance. In addition, persistent pre-occupation with controlling the fiscal deficit 
reduces the flexibility to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy.  
Budgetary deficits – directly measured – are only part of the fiscal burden of the state in 
India. It is well-known that contingent liabilities of the government are very large. In the past 
the government has had to bail out insolvent banks and other financial institutions (the latest 
being the Unit Trust of India) at severe cost (Sharma, 2004).  
(iv) Problems of Infrastructure  
India’s record in providing high quality, reliable and reasonably priced infrastructural 
services to its households and businesses has been inadequate. The World Economic Forum’s 
1998 Global Competitiveness Report ranked India last among 53 countries on the quality of 
overall infrastructure services.8 Indian households and businesses still receive infrastructure 
services largely through the public sector — often through government departmental 
undertakings. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this state of affairs will continue for 
some time. Even though the potential of the private sector to meet India’s pressing 
infrastructure needs is largely untapped, and hence can be expanded considerably, there will 
continue to be a major role for the public sector in providing infrastructural services, 
particularly in the less developed regions/states of India.  India’s infrastructure requirements 
have been put by one estimate at US$215 billion in the 2001 to 2006 period.9  
 However, before such investment can take place, the paucity of infrastructural facilities 
hampers rapid economic growth. Jha and Thapa (2003) document that states with poor 
                                                 
8 This ranking is cited in World Bank (2000). 
9 Estimates by the Expert Group on the Commercialization of Infrastructure Projects reported in 
NCAER (1996). 
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infrastructure have poor records of poverty reduction. Further, there is clear linkage between 
agricultural productivity and agricultural infrastructure. Jha and Thapa (2003) also document 
the links between poor pricing of electricity and aggravated distortions in its usage as well as 
huge losses in transmission and distribution.  
The upshot of these arguments is that there are important constraints to rapid economic 
growth in India.  Whereas high levels of the fiscal deficit and public debt reduce resources 
available for investment, poor infrastructure facilities reinforce the tendency toward 
increasing concentration of poverty.  The fact that some of the poorest regions in the country 
have poor economic reform and governance records as well as some of the highest population 
densities and thus have high representation in Parliament indicates that reform measures that 
do not appear to be beneficial in the short run have little political support. The fact that 
unemployment has actually increased during the period 1993-94 to 1999-00 is further 
indication of the lack of popular support for rapid liberalization and reform.  
IV. Prospects for alleviating the constraints on rapid economic growth 
That rapid economic liberalization of the form that took place in China beginning in the late 
1970s is difficult to achieve in India is now clear. In a democratic society tolerance for 
rapidly increasing inequality and slow realization of gains of liberalization for the poor is 
low.  For instance, India will not be able to countenance the vast regional inequality that has 
emerged in China between the coastal areas and the interior.  Hence, relieving the constraints 
on building consensus for rapid liberalization is an essential part of the strategy to sustain 
rapid economic growth in India.  
How likely is this? Although there exists room for reorienting subsidies it is difficult to see 
how their total magnitude can be reduced significantly.  Some expenditures are highly 
inflexible and three such items (interest payments, defence expenditure and subsidies) make 
up almost 100 percent of tax revenues.  India’s expenditure/GDP ratio is not much out of line 
for developing countries and is substantially below that of OECD countries.  
However, there is much to be gained from tax reform and substantial opportunity exists for 
raising the tax/GDP ratio.   This ratio has been stagnant for some time now and is 
substantially below that of OECD and even some developing countries. Jha, Chand and 
Sharma (2003) discuss the contours of a tax reform program to raise the tax/GDP ratio. This 
involves expanding the tax net by removing exemptions and taxing services as well as 
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agricultural income, consolidating and rationalizing indirect taxes into a value added tax and 
improving tax administration.   
Such tax reform and lowering the fiscal deficit becomes even more necessary because of the 
extent of contingent liabilities of the government. These include but are not confined to the 
non-performing assets of banks.  
Taking efforts to increase the employment elasticity of income growth is another important 
challenge facing Indian policymakers.  Rapid rise in agricultural employment must await 
substantial investment – particularly in agricultural infrastructure.  Employment growth in the 
services sector has been impressive but the capacity of this sector to absorb labour is limited.  
For purposes of employment expansion India will have to rediscover its latent comparative 
advantage in low value added manufacturing.  This has been the area of most rapid growth in 
China and several Southeast Asian countries. India did not enter this club and imposed high 
tariffs on these products while at the same time producing these product domestically in 
“small scale industries”, many of which were granted reservations for producing specific 
goods.  The result has been high cost production which is non-competitive both in the 
domestic and international markets.  
A more enlightened policy would be to remove the reservations for the small scale industrial 
sectors as well as reducing tariffs.  Labour market regulations can be made more flexible. 
After decades of high GDP growth China and Southeast Asia have moved up the value chain 
in manufacturing production and India could well occupy the vacated low value added 
manufacturing space. Indeed India could become one of the most important production 
centres in these areas. This also has the potential to create large increases in employment.  
Improvements in policy towards infrastructure have been suggested in a number of 
documents (see for example, India Infrastructure Report 2002, World Bank 2004). India is 
slowly moving in the direction of introducing competitive markets in infrastructure, with 
private sector production under modern regulatory structures. As a consequence some 
progress has been made in the areas of telecom, roads, ports, electricity and aviation. But 
much remains to be done. For example, in the area of electricity, the big change is the 
Electricity Act, which has mooted the idea of a pro-competitive framework whereby 
producers and consumers of electricity can interact in an unfettered market. However, after 
the 2004 Parliamentary elections the new government has already announced that the 
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implementation of the Electricity Act would be delayed by a year. In the meantime, a number 
of states have reverted to the practice of providing free electricity to farmers.  Thus progress 
on this front has been slow and there have been some retrograde steps as well.  
Furthermore, political expediency has imposed several serious burdens on the Indian 
railways.  An immediate reason for this is the paucity of funds.  Until about 1995 Indian 
Railways had been earning a surplus – now they have been accumulating huge and growing 
deficits. This has resulted in serious shortage of funds for modernization of the rail networks.  
New trains are introduced every year but there are very limited funds for even maintenance of 
tracks. The increasing financial burden on the railways is the result of several factors. First, 
there is gross cross-subsidization of lower class travel by upper class travel. Organizational 
structures have progressively been distorted with duplication of services. The partial 
privatisation of railway services that had been advocated has now been all but abandoned.  
Pay revisions consequent upon the Fifth Pay Commission’s Report the salary bill of the 
Railways has gone up inordinately high: without corresponding growth in productivity, staff 
costs of Indian Railways account for around 50 per cent of the organisation’s gross traffic 
receipts. The pension bill is also rising fast. While the pension pay out was 6.3 per cent of 
gross revenues in 1986, it is now almost 15 per cent and is set to rise even further. Hence the 
financial and operational condition of the Indian Railways does not show any sign of 
recovering soon.  
The one area in which considerable progress can be expected is telecom. Mobile telephone 
and associated technology has grown rapidly in India. India has in excess of 40 million 
mobile phones with a rate of growth of 2 million phones a month. Internet access has 
improved considerably and there are plans to bridge the rural-urban divide in internet 
connectivity by rapid expansion of services in rural areas.  But the recent decision to abandon 
the privatisation of MTNL (a government owned phone company serving Delhi and Mumbai) 
is a retrograde step.  
Some progress has also been achieved in the areas of roads. There is a substantial project to 
build new highways – including the so-called “golden quadrilateral” to connect the four 
major cities of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai with six lane expressways and 
supplementary feeder routes. Such programs will enable more rapid transport of goods and 
services between vast distances and enable firms separated by such distances to trade with 
each other directly.  
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The functioning of ports has also recorded some improvements – partly as a result of 
contracting out the operations of ports to international firms with specialised expertise on this 
subject. According to Kelkar (2004) the turnaround time at ports dropped by half, from 7.5 
days in 1996-97 to 3.5 days in 2001-02.  Airport privatisation has however suffered a setback 
after the 2004 elections as has the whole process of privatisation, per se.  
Thus the prospects for effective alleviation of the constraints facing higher economic growth 
are mixed.  However, just in order to ensure adequate employment opportunities, India needs 
real GDP growth of about 7 percent per annum. It remains to be seen whether a forward 
looking economic reforms program able to work around some of these constraints and ensure 
high and stable growth can be put in place.  
V. Conclusions  
After two decades of economic reforms the Indian economy is at a crossroads. The reforms 
program has yielded considerable returns in the form of higher and more stable growth as 
well as considerable modernization of the economy. After more than two decades of 
impressive economic growth and some important reforms as well as deregulation, the Indian 
economy is at the threshold of even higher growth.  
However, unforeseen and stubborn challenges have been thrown up especially in the areas of 
the high fiscal deficit and financial sector weakness, increasing regional and personal 
inequality, low elasticity of employment with respect to growth and inadequate infrastructure. 
Several of these, e.g., inadequate decline in poverty are such that they can be addressed best 
by high and sustained economic growth. However, these might act as short-term constraints 
on economic reforms especially when they play themselves out through the democratic 
process.  This is an important challenge for policymaking in India.   
The Indian economy is currently showing considerable promise in terms of growth 
performance.  However, success in attaining high and sustained rates of economic growth is 
not automatically guaranteed.    
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